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MENTIONING EXPRESSIONS
S u s a n  H A A C K
Dpt of Philosophy
Univers ity  of Warwic k
Conventry  Warwickshire CV47AL
In order to  mention an expression one must use (the same
or another) expression. Among the devices available fo r men-
tioning expressions there are:
1) defin ite  descriptions
2) p roper names
3) ita lics
4) quotation marks (
1
)It is the purpose o f  th is paper to  contribute to  the invest i-gation of the way these devices work. I  shall be arguing, speci-
fically, that the standard view of quotation marks is mistaken,
and that i t  g ives rise  to  d if f icu lt ies wh ich  a  more  adequate
view of quotation readily dispels.
1. De f in ite  descriptions
Since expressions have d ist inctive features, a  defin ite des-
cription can be devised wh ich  un iquely denotes a  g iven ex-
pression.
Some defin ite  descriptions denote i n  v irtu e  o f  contingent
features o f  the expression to  wh ich  they refer, features such
as, f o r instance, the  location o f  those expressions. Examples
would be:
The last sentence of John's speech.
The longest word  in  Princip le Mathematica.
Other definite descriptions wo rk rather differently, by exploit-
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ing t h e  structure  o f  th e  expressions t o  wh ich  t h e y  re fe r.
Examples would be:
The wf f  consisting of a left-hand bracket, a sentence le t-
ter, an implication sign, a sentence letter equiform to the
first sentence letter, a  right-hand bracket, in  that order.
The sentence consisting o f  the words consisting o f  the
12th, 9th, 15th, 14th, 19th, 1st, 18th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 5th, 18th,
3rd, 5th letters o f the English alphabet, in  that order
I sha ll re fer to  these, fo llowing  Tarski, as structura l descrip-
tions. Given  a  structura l description, i t  is  a  stra ightforward
matter to  discover what expression i t  denotes. Th is virtue  o f
structural descriptions I  shall re fer to as the recoverab ility o f
their denotata.
It migh t  be supposed tha t  structura l descriptions could be
used only to refer to expression types, not to expression tokens,
since a ll tokens of a given type wi l l  share the structure wh ich
a structu ra l description explo its. Fu rthe r re f lect ion  reveals,
however, that the reference of a structural description wi l l  be
ambiguous as between a type expression and a token expres-
sion.
What is said about the expression referred to may of course
resolve the ambiguity. Examples would  be:
and
The wo rd  consisting o f  the 18th, 5th, 4 th  letters o f  the
English alphabet, in  that order, occurs s ix  t imes on th is
page.
The wo rd  consisting o f  the 18th, 5th, 4 th  letters o f  the
English alphabet, in  that order, was the f irst  uttered b y
John.
Tarski, wh o  f inds d if f icu lt y i n  the  use o f  quotational meta-
languages, favours structural description as the optimal device
for mentioning expressions.
2. Prope r names
3. I t a l ics
Horses have four legs. (use)
Horses has six letters (mention)
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Proper names are commonly used to  re fer to certa in kinds o f
non-linguistic items, especially people and places. Expressions
are not o rd inarily g iven names. (Exceptions wou ld  be books,
poems, prayers.) However, it  would be possible, and has some-
times been thought to  be desirable, tha t  we  should re fe r to
expressions b y  'christening them, and then, to  mention them,
use the ir names.
There a re  conventions about the  use o f  personal names.
Some, f o r instance, are  usua lly g iven to  males, others to  fe -
males. Nevertheless, even  g iven  these conventions, a n  im-
portant feature o f  the o rd inary uses o f  proper names is  tha t
there is  n o  systematic wa y  o f  d iscovering wh o m a  p roper
name denotes. Thus, p roper names, i f  used as a  device f o r
mentioning expressions, wo u ld  la ck  th e  v irt u e  o f  recover-
ability. This seems, on the face of it, a disadvantage. But those
who recommend the use of proper names for mentioning expres-
sions tend to  take  the  opposite v ie w.  Fo r i t  is  common t o
find in  the literature the thesis that reference to  expressions
by means of quotation marks is closely comparable to reference
to expressions b y means o f  proper names, specif ica lly in  that
the denotata are no more recoverable f rom quotation expres-
sions than f ro m proper names. I t  is  therefore thought to  be
prudent to  employ proper ames rather than quotation marks,
since the failure of recoverability is more apparent with  proper
names.
Another way of forming an expression denoting an expres-
sion is to write  the denoted expression in  italics. For example:
If one thinks of italics as a specific kind  of script, then there
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wi l l  be some languages f o r wh ich  the notion o f  ita licisation
has not been given sense. On the other hand, i f  one treats as
a k in d  o f  ita licisat ion a n y typographical device  wh ich  pe r-
forms the function which ita lic script performs for languages in
the Roman alphabet (as one thinks o f  several typographically
distinct devices, such as "  " ,  '  <  >  ', " ,  ', as a l l  quotation
devices) then one can g ive a sense to the idea o f ita licisation
for any language.
Italicisation, l i k e  structu ra l descrip tion b u t  u n like  p rope r
names, has the virtue  o f  recoverability. The denotation o f  an
italicised expression is the unitalicised expression. Ita licisation
has, however, the disadvantage that i t  is no t  iterable. I f  one
wishes t o  re fe r to  an ita licised expression, one w i l l  have to
employ some other device than ita licisation — structural des-
cription, perhaps, o r quotation. Since one might ve ry we ll need
a means of referring to expressions wh ich  themselves re fer to
expressions, fo r example in  the kind  of investigation in  wh ich
I am now engaged, this seems a serious drawback.
4. Quota t ion  marks
By putting quotation marks around an expression one forms
another expression wh ich  denotes the  orig ina l expression. I n
what follows, I  sha ll ca ll the denoted expression the 'quoted
expression', and the denoting expression 'the quotation expres-
sion'. Quotation, un like italicisation, is iterable. And quotation
seems, on the face o f  it, also to have the virtue  of recoverabi-
lity:  the  denotation o f  a  quotation expression is  the  quoted
expression.
The standard vie w
However, a common — indeed, one might say, the standard
— v ie w denies quotation th is virtue . The thesis is  va riously
put as fo llows: the result of enclosing an expression in  quota-
tion marks is 'a new, un ita ry expression' o f  which the orig inal
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expression is not (in  any interesting sense) a  part; i t  is ' impro-
per to  read under quotation marks'; no expression can be, a t
the same time, mentioned and used.
For example:
A  quotation is not a description, but a hieroglyph; i t  de-
signates its object not by describing i t  in  terms o f  other
objects, b u t  b y  p icturing it .  The meaning o f  the who le
does n o t  depend upon the  meaning o f  the  constituent
words. The personal name buried with in  the f irst wo rd  of
the statement.
(11) 'C ice ro '  has six letters
e.g. is  log ica lly no more  germane to  the  statement than the
verb ' le t ' wh ich  is buried in  the last word.
(Quine, [1940], p. 26) (
2
)Quotation-mark names ma y be treated like  single words
of a language, and thus like  syntactica lly simple expres-
sions... Eve ry quotation-mark name is then a constant in-
dividual name o f  definite expression o f  the same nature
as the proper name o f  a man...
(Tarski, [1931], p. 159)
I shall argue that the doctrine of quotation characterised above,
to wh ich  I  shall sometimes refer, f o r obvious reasons, as the
'logical block' theory, is mistaken. I shall begin by arguing that
it  is proper to read under quotation marks. By this I  mean that
it  is permissible, and may in  some cases be essential, to  take
note of syntactic or semantic features of the quoted expression
in order to understand, o r to determine the tru th o r fa lsity of,
a sentence in which a quotation expression appears. I shall then
argue that, in  view of this, i t  must be admitted that the quoted
expression is, in  an interesting sense, part of the quotation ex-
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pression, and hence, that the quoted expression, in  its occur-
ence as part of the quotation expression, is at once mentioned
and used.
Against the standard v ie w
Routley and Goddard, in  [19661, a llow that, in  certain cases,
reading under quotation marks is  permissible. Bu t  they d is-
tinguish t wo  kinds o f  mention, syntact ic and semantic, and
allow reading under quotation marks o n ly in  the la t te r case.
As I  shall show, however, the ir distinction between syntactic
and semantic mention is shaky, and the ir argument for reading
under quotation marks in  the case of semantic mention can be
extended.
The d ist inct ion  between syn tact ic a n d  semantic men t ion
turns on the fact that sometimes we refer to an expression as a
pre liminary t o  a t t ribu t ing  a  syn tact ic predicate t o  i t ,  a n d
sometimes we  refer to an expression as a p re liminary to a t t ri-
buting a semantic predicate to it. This is, indeed, a  fact. But it
is also a fact that sometimes we  refer to an object as a  p re li-
minary to  attributing a  shape predicate to  it ,  and sometimes
we refer to an expression as a pre liminary to attributing a co-
lour predicate to  t i;  bu t no-one supposes that th is fact shows
that there are two kinds of mention, shape mention and colour
mention. I n  v ie w o f  the inadequacy o f  the ir exp licit  reason,
one suspects tha t  Routley and Goddard's convict ion  o f  the
necessity t o  d istinguish t wo  kinds o f  rnZntion springs f ro m
their further belief that semantic mention is 'impure', since in
cases o f  semantic mention reading under quotation marks is
allowed, and so in  such cases the quotation expression is used
as we ll as mentioned.
Their argument for the propriety of reading under quotation
marks in  the case o f semantic mention is that to  understand,
or determine the tru th  of, a  sentence in  wh ich  the quotation
expression occurs i t  may be necessary to  'read (with  under-
standing)' the quoted expression. Among the ir examples is the
order:
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Give a synonym for 'brother'.
which, as they say, cannot be obeyed unless one understands
the word  'brother'. But attention to features o f  the quoted ex-
pression is  sometimes, equally, ca lled fo r in  cases when the
predicate applied t o  th e  mentioned expression i s  syn tact ic
rather than semantic. Consider the fo llowing  sentence, wh ich
Routley and Goddard o ffer as an  example o f  syntactic men-
tion:
Arrange 'dog', 'cat' and 'animal' in  alphabetical order.
Unless one reads under the quotation marks and pays atten-
tion to  the f irs t  le t te r in  the quoted expression, one cannot
obey this order; fo r a ll the quotation expressions begin with  a
quotation mark.  However, one has to  read the second letters
whenever one is  asked to  arrange in  alphabetical o rde r ex-
pressions wh ich  a ll begin with  the same letter; and th is does
not show that, say 'ristotle ' is  part  o f  'Aristotle ', o r  'quinus'
of 'Aquinus' in  any sense more interesting than that they are
physically parts o f the larger expressions; and in  this sense i t
is conceded, even on the 'logical b lock' view, that quoted ex-
pressions are part  o f  quotation expressions. An d  i t  migh t  be
objected that although reading under the quotation marks is
required, read ing with  understanding is not. Bu t other cases
can be constructed when more than mere scanning of the shape
of the quoted expression is called for.
For example, to  ve rify:
Water Boards pipe water to a ll homes in  th is area
is a  grammatical English sentence, i t  is presumably necessary
to read the quoted expression with  at least such understanding
as is required to recognise that 'pipe' occurs as a  verb rather
than a noun. I t  has to be admitted that there is some unclarity
as t o  the  fo rce  o f  'read wi t h  understanding' a s opposed t o
'read'. Is it  necessary, for example, to 'read with  understanding'
under the quotation marks in
There are six words in  the sentence 'This red is darker than
that red' ?
This u n cla rity contributes t o  the  p lausib ility o f  the hypo-
thesis that there is no clear distinction, but rather a continuum
284 S U S A N  HA A CK
of cases, f rom bare scanning of the shapes to ' fu ll understand-
ing'. O f  course it  must be conceded that attention to semantic
features o f  the quoted expression can hard ly be essential to
determination of the truth-value o f ascriptions to  i t  o f syntac-
tic predicates; i f  b y  'read wi t h  understanding' Rou t ley and
Goddard meant 'attend to semantic features' the ir thesis would
be t riva lly  true — but, b y the same token, also re la t ive ly un-
interesting. An d  this, t riv ia l,  thesis, wou ld  not show that a t-
tention (va riously t o  syntact ic o r  semantic) features o f  the
quoted expression could be essential to  determination o f  the
truth-value o f  sentences containing the quotation expression.
This is my  thesis.
It may be necessary to emphasise that I  am not maintaining
that it  is always necessary to read under quotation marks, but
only that i t  is  a lways proper, and sometimes necessary. A n
example o f  a sentence where it  is not necessary would be:
"Cicero' has six letters' contains a quotation expression.
If reading under quotation marks,  wh e n  'reading ' means
more than mere attention to the physical shape o f  the quoted
expression, is proper, it  seems to fo llow that the quoted expres-
sion is in  an interesting sense part of the quotation expression.
For not on ly is the quoted expression physica lly a part o f  the
quotation expression, bu t  also, it s  syntactic o r semantic p ro -
perties may be necessary to the understanding o r verif ication
of sentences in  wh ich  the quotation expression occurs. And,
when th is is the case, then, one could say, the quoted expres-
sion is being used as we ll as mentioned.
Some applications
It has perhaps been insufficiently stressed, so far, how coun-
terintuitive the standard doctrine is. The commonsense v ie w
is, sure ly, tha t  one can read ily d iscern the  denotation o f  a
quotation expression, and that one does so precisely by reading
under the quotation marks.
The oddity of the standard view wi l l  become more apparent
if  one considers some o f  the unnecessary d iff icu lt ies i t  gene-
rates.
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(i) O n e  such d if f icu lty appears as an Analysis 'puzzle'. Pro-
fessor Anscombe invites comments on the fo llowing problem:
It is impossible to be told anyone's name. For if  I am told
'That man's name is 'Smith"  h is name is mentioned, no t
used, and I  hear the name of his name but not his name.
([1957])
On the  standard doctrine o f  quotation, there  is  indeed a
severe problem. To  sa y wha t  someone's name is,  one must
mention h is name; and, since no  expression can be a t  once
mentioned and  used, n o t  use  i t .  Th e  quotation expression
denoting the name is a un ita ry expression, o f  which the name
itself is  n o t  a  p roper part. Usin g  the  quotation expression
"Smith" to  denote the name 'Smith ' is  comparable to  g iving
the name 'Smith ' a  proper name, say 'Mary' .  So i t  wou ld  be
no more apparent f rom
That man's name is 'Smith'
than f rom
That man's name is Ma ry
what that man's name is.
When the standard doctrine is rejected the puzzle vanishes.
The quotation expression "Smith"  is not a un itary expression;
'Smith' is  part o f  it .  And  so i t  is apparent f rom 'His name is
'Smith", as it  is not from His  name is Mary',  what his name is.
It may be worth  pointing out that one wa y o f  re ferring to
an expression, wh ich  has not been mentioned so far, is simp ly
to use tha t  ve ry  expression. (Carnap ca lls th is the  'autono-
mous use' o f  the expression.) On e  wa y  o f  g iving  the  man's
name is simp ly to say:
That man's name is Smith.
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I used 'Ma ry a s the name o f  the name 'Smith', above, to  t ry
to avoid the confusion which might have arisen had the name
'Smith' been given the name, say, 'Robinson', with  the case o f
autonomous use.
(ii) T h e  standard doctrine also gives rise to  complications in
the theory o f quotation which, once that doctrine is rejected,
seem s imp ly  unnecessary. F o r  example, Garve r,  i n  [1965],
argues that a  special, new quotation device is needed i f  one
is to have a device for mentioning the meaning of expressions.
What lies behind this seems to be the idea that, i f  the meaning
of an expression mentioned is in  question, then the expression
must be being mentioned in  a special way. In  a  simila r way,
Alston argues, i n  [1963], tha t  we  must  wri t e  meaning state-
ments in  the form
'Procrastinate' means put people off
using ita lics rather than quotation marks on the righ t because
'we are  neither using 'put people off ' n o r re ferring to  i t  in  a
way that could be done b y enclosing i t  in  quotes ' f o r" p ro -
















































arise f rom the exclusivity of the distinction made, in  the stan-
dard account, between use and mention. Bu t when the stan-
dard account is dropped, one can see that ord inary quotation
is perfectly suitable for reference to the meaning of an expres-
sion. One can refer to the meaning o f an expression by using
a defin ite description wh ich  includes a  quotation expression
denoting that expression, e.g.
The meaning o f  'procrastinate".
(iii) t h e  problems mentioned so fa r have been, so  to  speak,
local to  the theory o f  quotation. But the standard account is
also implicated in  the generation o f  imag inary d iff icu lt ies i n
other areas.
Church in  [1950], presents, specifically against Carnap's ana-
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lysis, an argument, the translation argument, which, i f  correct,
would show that no analysis o f sentences o f the form:
x believes that man is a rational animal
in wh ich  quotation expressions appear, co u ld  possib ly b e
correct. The argument goes as fo llows. I f  one translates the
'analysandum and Carnap's analysans:
x is disposed to  respond a f f irmat ive ly to  some sentence
in some language L wh ich  is intensionally isomorphic to
'Man is a rational animal' in  English
into another language, say German, then, wh ile  the translation
of the analysandum is en t ire ly in  German, the translation o f
the analysans contains a  quoted English sentence. Hence the
translation of the analysandum is comprehensible to  someone
who speaks on ly German, wh ile  the translation of the analys-
ans is not; and so the analysandum and the analysans cannot
mean the same.
Now one (of the numerous) faults of this argument (1 is that
at one po in t  the standard doctrine o f  quotation is  required,
whereas a t  another point i t  is discarded. The thesis that one
must not read under quotation marks is presumably what sup-
ports the, otherwise surprising, assumption that one must not
translate under quotation marks, an assumption wh ich  is cru -
cial to the premiss that any correct translation o f  the analys-
ans w i l l  conta in  a  quoted English sentence. However,  t h e
view of quotation is not even consistently maintained fo r the
duration of the argument. For if  it  is not proper to read under
quotation marks a German speaker can presumably understand
the translation o f the analysons in  spite o f  not understanding
English; fo r on the standard view the quoted English sentence
is no part of the analysons anyway.
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Towards an alternative account
The commonsense view, wh ich  the standard account rejects
and which I  have favoured, that the denotatum of a quotation
expression is  stra igh tfo rward ly recoverable, suggests a n  a l -
ternative account: that quotation may be treated as a function.
A  function is a relation such that
(x) (y) (z) (x  Ry &  xRz ---> y =  z)
The suggestion is th is. The quotation function, the  resu lt  o f
writ ing  an  expression in  quotation marks, has as va lue  the
quoted expression. I f  the result o f  enclosing each o f  two  ex-
pressions in  quotation marks is the same, the two  expressions
must be the same.
Quine objects to  this suggestion that the tru th  of
Tu lly =  Cicero
does not entail the truth of
'Tully' =  'Cicero '
But this objection is beside the point, since although the man
Tu lly is indeed identical with  the man Cicero, the name 'Tu lly'
is not identical with  the name 'Cicero', so one should not ex-
pect the result of enclosing the name 'Tu lly'  in  quotation marks
to be the same as the result of enclosing the name 'Cicero ' in
quotation marks.
Kaplan [1969] is also inclined to deny that quotation can be
treated as a function, since, he argues, the rule, that the result
of enclosing an expression in  quotation marks is  a  standard
name o f  tha t expression, is  u n like  ru les f o r t rue  functional
expressions, such as ' ,  ,̒/ ' in  not being single-valued. But th is
is not the relevant rule, wh ich  is, rather, that the value of the
result o f  enclosing an expression in  quotation marks, is  that
expression. Th is ru le  is single-valued.
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A sustained discussion o f the proprie ty o f  the treatment o f
quotation as a  function is to  be found in  Tarski's [1931]. I t  is
essential, therefore, to  consider Tarski's arguments in  detail.
He offers four:
(1) T h e  sense of quotation functions is insuff iciently clear.
(2) Qu o ta t io n  functions wou ld  not be extensional.
(3) O n  the functional account a quotation expression such
as " p "  w i l  be ambiguous as between a  function o f  a
variable argument, and  th e  name o f  a  le t te r o f  th e
alphabet.
(4) W i t h  the  he lp  o f  quotation functions, semantic para-
doxes ma y be formulated even without the use o f  the
predicates ' t rue '  o r  'false'.
To the f irst  objection one could reply, ad hominen, that the
formulations o f  the standard account leave a good deal to  be
desired. Furthermore, and  more  seriously, I  have attempted
above t o  g ive  a  reasonably precise ind ica t ion  o f  wh a t  the
function account involves. And a more detailed, and perfectly
precise, account can now be found in Belnap and Grover [1973].
In re p ly  t o  the  second objection, one  must  concede tha t
quotation functions are, indeed, n o t  extensional, since i t  is
not the case that, i f  two sentences are mate ria lly equivalent,
then the result o f  enclosing the f irst  i n  quotation marks w i l l
necessarily be the same as the result o f  enclosing the second
in quotation marks. And it  may be desirable, as Tarski thinks,
for the log ician to  concentrate on  extensional functions. Bu t
this sure ly provides, at most, grounds for a refusal to deal with
quotation at all, not a reason for for refusing to deal with  quo-
tation as a function. Tarski offers no alternative account of quo-
tation wh ich  w i l l  enable h im t o  t rea t  i t  extensionally, b u t
resorts instead to the use of structural descriptions. One might
add that that two sentences are materia lly equivalent is, equal-
ly, no guarantee that a  structural description o f the f irst  w i l l
be the same as a  structural description of the second.
The th ird objection seems to be no more than a consequence
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of, and no more serious than, the fact that the le tter 'p ' could
be e ither the 16th le t te r o f  the alphabet, o r  a  propositional
variable.
The fourth  objection is,  clea rly,  th e  most  serious. Ta rsk i
offers a  proof o f the L ia r paradox using on ly quotation func-
tions a n d  negation (and n o t  ' t ru e  o r  'fa lse'). However,  h e
nowhere attempts to  show that the possib ility o f deriving the
contradiction depends upon the  treatment o f  quotation as a
function. And it  can be shown, in  fact, that a contradiction can
be derived on the assumption of the existence of any means of
denoting a l l  expressions. The proof stems f rom Reach [1936]:
'Nm [ x
]  
( y ) '  






















































































1 (1 )  T  ( p )  (Nm [pi (x) D  p )
2 (2 ) ( (  3 z) (Nm [x] (z) &
N m  [ y ]  ( Z ) ) )  ( 1 : 1  D  P ; )
2 (3 ) ( (  x )  (Nm [pi (x) &
Nm [q] (x))) ( p  q )
4 (4 ) N m  [13] (x) &  N m [q] (x)
4 (5 ) (  3 x) (Nm [p] (x) &  Nm [q] (x))
2,4 (6 ) p  q
2 (7 ) (Nm [p] (x) &
Nm [q] (x)) D p q
2 (8 ) (Nm [IA (x) &
Nm [q] (x)) D  p  q






2, 4 (10) ((— p &  (— q p ) )
2, 4 (11) — q p
2 (12) (Nm [p] (x) &
Nm [q] (x)) q  D p )
2 (13) (Nm [q] (x) &
Nm [p] (x)) D ( — q D p )
2(14) (N m [q] (x)
df of T
Ass.
2, plx, qly, xlz,
2, qlx, fly, x  z,
and df
Ass.












13, (q D p) D r
1,2 (29) N m  [T] (x) D (T T )  2 8 ,  df
30 (30) N m  [T] (x) A s s .
1, 2, 30 (31) T  T  2 9 ,  30, Mpp.
Now, the only special assumptions which this proof employs,
besides the defin it ion o f  'T', are certa in princip les o f  the ex-
tended propositional calculus (a t  l in e  (2) a n d  in  the  use o f
universal generalisation a t  line  (19)), and the assumption (a t
'line (30)) that, f o r any expression, there is  some expression
which denotes th a t  expression. Th e  p roo f  does n o t  requ ire
the assumption that fo r every expression, there is a quotation
expression wh ich  denotes that expression, nor, a fort io ri,  does
it require the assumption that quotation be treated as a  func-
tion. (I t  may be worth  noting that Tarski himself, in  another
part of the paper, attributes the generation of the paradoxes to
semantic closure, and in  consequence embodies a  restrict ion
to semantically open languages in  his fo rmal adequacy condi-
tions. There is a relevant discussion in  Grover [1973]1
Tarski's re jection o f  quotation functions is o f  some impor-
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q D (p D r)
15 (15) Nm [q] (x) Ass.
2, 15 (16) q D (Nm [p] (x) p ) 14, 15, Mpp.
17 (17) Ass.
2, 15, 17 (18) Nm [p] (X) D p 16, 17, Mpp.
2, 15, 17 (19) (P) (Nm [P] (
c )  
P )
18, )  intro.
2, 15 (20) -  q D (p) (Nm [p] (x) p ) 17, 19, Cp.
2 (21) Nm [q] (X) D
q D ((p) (Nm [p] (X) D •-•-• p))
15, 20, Cp.
1, 2 (22) Nm [q] (x) D ( •••• q  D T) 1, 21
1, 2 (23) Nm [T] (x) T  D T) 22, Tiq















1, df • =•





















1 (26) T D (Nm [T] (X) D  T ) Instance of 25
1 (27) Nm [T] (x) D (T T ) 26, p D (q D r)
q D (p D r)
1, 2 (28) N m  [T] (x) D ((T D" .  T) &
 -  T D T))
23, 27, p D q,
p D r  p
(q D r)
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tance to his argument for his definition o f truth. The objective
is to provide a definition wh ich  wi l l  entail a ll instances of the
T-schema:
S is true p
(where the referring expression on the left-hand side denotes
the sentence wh ich  appears on  the righ t).  Since one wa y  o f
referring to  a  sentence is to  enclose i t  in  quotation marks, i t
might look tempting to offer as a  definition.
(I) ( p )  ('p' is true p )
Tarski rejects this kind of definition, because he regards quan-
tification in to  quotation contexts as nonsense. And  he regards
quantification into quotation contexts as nonsense because he
rejects th e  funct ion  account o f  quotation i n  favou r o f  th e
'logical b lock' theory. If, as that theory has it ,  'p ' is  no more
part of "p" than 'x is  of 'Texas', then (1) is no more inte llig ib le
than
(2) ( x )  (Texas is  large)
But if, as I  have argued, the 'log ica l b lock' v ie w o f  quotation
is untenable, and  i f  Tarski's arguments against the  function
view are inconclusive, then Tarski's reasons fo r re jecting (1)
are inadequate. I t  does not follow, o f course, that (I ) is accept-
able as a  definition o f  truth, on ly that, i f  i t  is not, th is is no t
for the reasons Tarski gives.
Routley and Goddard f in d  (1 ) unacceptable because th e y
object to the predication of truth of sentences. (This would, o f
course, be  an  objection, equally, t o  Tarski's defin it ion.) B u t
since I  see nothing objectionable in  attributing t ru th  to  sen-
tences, I  should re ject th is argument.
(1) employs proposit iona l quantif iers. I t  mig h t  ,therefore
be argued that the 'p' on the right-hand side of the biconditional
has to be construed as the name of a sentence, not as a senten-
ce. Such a construal would, of course, make (1) ungrammatical.
MENTIONING EXPRESSIONS 2 9 3
However, i t  could be suggested, in  reply, tha t the grammati-
ca lity o f  (1) can be maintained i f  the propositional quantif ier
is read, not objectually, but substitutionally, where the appro-
priate substituends would be, not names of sentences, but sen-
tences. This suggestion, i f  i t  could be worked out, migh t also
provide some re lie f to the ontological difficulties wh ich  Quine,
in [1934], f inds in  the interpretation o f  protothetic (extended
propositional calculus).
Summary
My  object has been to support a commonsense, function view
of quotation over the standard, ' log ica l b lock' theory. I  have
argued, f irst, tha t  the central tenets o f  the standard v ie w are
false; second, that the standard view gives rise to puzzles and
difficulties wh ich  th e  function v ie w avoids; th ird ,  th a t  the
usual objections t o  th e  funct ion  v ie w a re  groundless; a n d
fourth, that adoption of the function view promises to provide
a new perspective on the theory of tru th  (
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(I) Thes e devices have other uses than ment ioning expressions, o f  course.





























































expression is  rather a  hierogly ph than a  desc ript ion seems t o  support  the
thesis whic h Quine goes on to deny, that  the quoted expression is  part  o f
the quotat ion expression. And it  is  curious  to f ind Quine apparent ly  a llow-
ing that  the v erb ' let '  is  buried in  'let ters '.  The  main d r if t  o f  the passage

































































of quotat ion marks. I ,  o f  course, hav e t reated italic s  and quotat ion marks




















































( )  A n  ea r ly  v ers ion o f  t h is  paper was  read i n  1969 t o  a  s eminar i n
Cambridge, where  I  benefited es pec ially  f rom comments  f rom Prof .  W i l -
liams and Dr.  Smiley .  I  was  also helped, part ic ularly  wit h  t he assessment
of ( I ) ,  by  a  discussion wi t h  Mr.  Fox  o f  the Univ ers it y  o f  La Trobe.
